The aim of this paper is to examine whether and to what extent bank capital requirements and liquidity standards influence the level of bank stability. Our approach is that both capital and liquidity affect lending growth, which in turn affects bank stability. We construct a panel dataset on a sample of 2,054 commercial banks from 117 developed and developing countries during the 2000-16 period. By applying a two-stage least squares (2SLS) empirical methodology, our findings show that capital and liquidity have a negative direct impact on the level of bank stability. However, this influence is counteracted by an indirect positive effect through the increased level of credit. Our results are not homogeneous across legal and institutional environments. In particular, we provide evidence on more relevant relationships in countries with higher level of protection of creditor rights and lower restrictions on non-traditional banking activities. Our empirical findings are robust to different specifications of the empirical model and to potential endogeneity problems.
Bank capital and liquidity requirements have been put under the spotlight from both regulators and scholars over the last decades with the aim of reducing the probability of crises and enhancing transparency and fair business practices in banking, as well as their efficiency and competitiveness (Tutino, 2015; Tutino et al., 2011) . The first relevant regulatory attempt to tackle these issues dates back to 1988 with the first Basel Capital Accord (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988), while the last significant step of this evolutionary process was Basel III regulation in 2010 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010) and the implementation of CRR/CRD IV from 1 January 2014. This new framework is based on three standards: capital, liquidity, and corporate governance. Capital standards have imposed banks a stricter definition of the eligible instruments to be used for capital requirements, as well as additional buffers. As for the liquidity standards, two new buffers have been introduced: the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013, 2014) . The main objective of the LCR is to enhance the liquidity risk profiles in the short term by imposing banks to maintain an adequate stock of high quality liquid assets. The NSFR requires banks to maintain a stable funding profile over the medium term.
Financial research has tried to shed light on the role played by capital and liquidity on bank stability in order to search for an appropriate design of regulation. However, the study of this relationship has provided mixed results. From one side, papers such as Behn et al. (2016) present evidence on a negative relationship between capital and lending. Noss and Toffano (2016) show that an increase in capital is associated with a reduction in lending during economic upswings. Aiyar et al. (2016) draw similar conclusions from their analysis of the UK banking system, underlining the importance of capital and monetary policy in determining the level of lending.
From the other side, Carlson et al. (2013) cast doubts on the relationship between capital requirements and credit. According to them, this relationship is significant during and only shortly following the 2008 financial crisis, but not for other periods. Deli and Hasan (2017) , over a sample of 125 countries during the 1998-2011 period, show that capital stringency has a weak negative effect on loan growth, but this impact is completely offset when banks hold a relatively high level of capital. Ko sak et al. (2015) document a positive and significant effect of high quality capital on loan growth during the financial crisis episode.
As for the relationship between liquidity and lending, the literature is scarcer. Cornett et al. (2011) show that banks that held more illiquid assets increased liquidity and reduced lending during the recent crisis. Kim and Sohn (2017) remark the importance of liquidity in determining the sign of the relationship between capital and lending. They show that capital has a significant positive effect on lending only if banks already retain a sufficient amount of liquid assets. Moreover, this relationship seems to hold only for large banks. Naceur et al. (2018) make it clear that the relationship between capital, liquidity, and lending is extremely complex. They find that US banks, especially small ones, increase their capital base when they boost lending, whereas capital ratios negatively affect European large banks' credit supply. As for liquidity indicators, they find a positive impact on lending for US banks, whereas for large European banks the sign of this relationship depends upon the type of lending.
Banking literature has also investigated the direct effect of capital on bank risk. Calem and Rob (1999) , using data from the US banking industry for the period 1984-93, find a non-linear (U-shaped) relationship between capital and risk. They suggest that imposing banks stricter regulatory requirements is a good strategy for regulators only if banks hold a relatively low amount of capital. In contrast, if banks were already highly capitalized, an increase in capital would lead to a higher risk exposure. Schliephake (2016) confirms this effect. In particular, capital requirements seem to reduce risk, unless banks operate in a highly competitive environment during and in the aftermath of a crisis. In this scenario, stricter capital requirements could increase bank risk exposure. Laeven et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence on the role played by size. Specifically, they show that the level of risk is lower for better capitalized banks and that this effect is more pronounced for large financial institutions.
Previous literature has also tested the relationship between bank lending and stability. Salas and Saurina (2002) , using data on Spanish commercial and saving banks for the period 1985-97, find that credit risk is strongly influenced by individual bank-level variables, including lending growth. Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2006) study the interaction between the informational structure of loan market and lending. Their results support the idea of a positive relationship between credit expansion and bank risk at aggregated level. Foos et al. (2010) find that lending growth leads to higher level of risk. This relationship became probably even stronger after the financial crisis, as pointed out by Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) .
To our best knowledge, however, no paper studies the influence that capital and liquidity have on bank stability and how it could take place through the changes in credit supply that, at the same time, are motivated by capital and liquidity requirements. In this paper, therefore, we contribute to the literature that has tried to shed light on the channels through which capital and liquidity may affect bank stability. Given the above-referred mixed evidence, we state our basic hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Bank capital and liquidity requirements affect bank stability in a direct way and through changes in credit supply.
We contribute to previous literature analyzing the direct and indirect effects of capital and liquidity on bank stability. Using a panel dataset of 2,054 commercial banks examined during the 2000-16 period, our results indicate that capital and liquidity are positively related to loan growth. Although both regulatory aspects have a negative direct effect on stability, it emerges that lending growth helps banks to improve their stability levels.
The above-referred effects of capital and liquidity on lending are robust to the inclusion of a specific set of control variables and after considering the quality of the existent loan portfolio. Furthermore, in countries with higher levels of protection of creditor rights and lower restrictions to non-traditional banking activities, the magnitude of the effects of capital and liquidity requirements to promote stability through the lending channel is higher.
Overall, although there is a direct effect of capital and liquidity requirements on bank stability, it is important to take into consideration also the indirect effect, mediated through bank lending. Moreover, our evidence highlights the role of both bank-and country-level characteristics, which may affect the relationships among Basel III regulatory environment, lending and stability.
In the following section, we describe the sample, model, and variables. Section 2 presents the empirical results. The final section concludes.
Method Sample
Bank-level information comes from ORBIS Bank Focus. Whenever they are available, we use consolidated bank balance sheet and income statement data. We drop banks for which we do not have financial data during our sample period to construct measures of capital and liquidity, loan growth, and stability.
Country-level data on bank market characteristics, creditor rights, and macroeconomic variables come from the World Bank Global Financial Development database, World Bank Development Indicators, and the Institute's Governance Group. Variables measuring restrictions on non-traditional banking activities come from the World Bank's surveys on Bank Regulation and Supervision by Barth et al. (2013) .
Our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel dataset from up to 2,054 banks and a maximum of 12,538 bank-year observations in 117 countries during the 2000-2016 period.
Econometric model
Our empirical analysis considers that capital and liquidity requirements may affect loan growth and stability simultaneously and that changes in granted loans may be an indirect channel leading to changes in bank stability. This analysis requires a procedure in two stages in order to control for endogeneity about loan growth and stability and their potential simultaneous dependence on both regulatory features. We combine a two stage least squares (2SLS) procedure with panel data estimators.
We regress our proxy for bank stability on capital and liquidity variables and on our measure of loan growth, controlling for other factors at both bank and country-level. The structural equation to be estimated is defined as follows:
where i, j, and t refer to the bank, country, and year, respectively. We consider the bank Z-Score as the main dependent variable of our study. TIER1 ijt-1 , is our proxy for capital requirements. LIQUIDITY ijt-1 contains the two variables that we define to proxy for the Basel III liquidity standards. We include additional bank (BANK ijt ) and country (COUNTRY jt ) level control variables. As bank-level controls, we include asset size, the share of non-interest income in total bank income, and overhead costs. We include the annual Lerner index, the annual growth rate of per capita GDP, and the inflation rate, as country-level controls. p j and u t are the set of country and year-fixed effects to control for characteristics that are specific to each country and year. These specific controls allow us to capture most of the unobserved bankinvariant effects that are specific to each country or year and that are not included in the regression. The countryyear specific effect (k jt ) controls for aggregate country-specific shocks and potential changes in institutional and regulatory country-level characteristics. This approach has the advantage that it is not necessary for additional country time-varying variables to be included in the regression on their own. l i is a bank-specific effect, which is assumed to be constant for bank i over t. e ijt is a white-noise error term.
ΔLOANSp ijt approximates the growth of bank net loans. In order to examine if the effect of capital and liquidity on bank stability could be mediated by the different lending behavior of banks, we calculate the predicted value of ΔLOANS by estimating a first-stage regression in which the observed values of this variable are the dependent variable.
The first-stage equation explaining the growth in bank loans (ΔLOANS ijt ) is:
Given the endogenous nature of the relationships among regulation, lending, and stability, our method requires all the explanatory variables in model (1)(1) to be included as independent variables of the first-stage regression obtaining the predicted values of ΔLOANS. This equation has its own predetermined variable, KKZ. It is an index capturing the level of institutional quality on each country (Kaufmann et al., 2009) . Appropriate instruments should affect the second-stage dependent variable only through their effect on the first-stage endogenous variable. In our case, KKZ should affect bank stability only through its impact on the variation of loans. Institutional quality promotes financial development and, thus, economic growth (La Porta et al., 1998) . The argument is that operating in an environment where the financial system is well developed is an advantage for more financially dependent industries given the well-functioning lending channel. The provision of credit is higher in such environments and, therefore, it spurs economic growth. Given this reasoning, we expect KKZ to affect banks' growth of net loans positively. In addition to selecting our instrument based on economic arguments, we require it to pass relevance conditions from an econometric point of view. We ensure that the first-stage Wald test for the instrument is statistically significant; thereby indicating that it is relevant for the empirical explanation of the endogenous variable.
The fitted values of ΔLOANS (ΔLOANSp) are used in the second stage as independent variable to estimate model (1). The 2SLS approach allows us to separate different effects of capital and liquidity requirements in the equation explaining bank stability. Hence, the coefficients b 1 and b 2 of model (1) would respectively indicate the direct effect of capital requirements and liquidity standards on the level of bank stability regardless of potential changes in lending. The coefficient b 3 would capture the extent to which both regulatory requirements influence bank stability through changes in the growth of loans.
Variables

Bank stability and loan growth
We use the Z-Score (ZSCORE) to proxy for the level of bank stability. 1 This variable has been traditionally used as an inverse measure of bank risk (Cubillas and Su arez, 2018) . It is computed equaling the return on assets plus the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. A 4-year moving window is used to estimate standard deviations for each bank in each year. A higher Z-score indicates that a bank is more stable because it is inversely related to the probability of bank insolvency. Given that the Z-score is highly skewed, we use its natural logarithm, which is normally distributed.
Following Deli and Hasan (2017) or Naceur et al. (2018) , among others, the growth in the amount of lending is defined as the annual growth rate of bank net loans over the level of total loans in the previous year (ΔLOANS) expressed in US dollars.
Capital and liquidity
We use the TIER1 capital ratio as the variable that approximates the Basel III capital requirements. In order to consider the new liquidity standards defined by Basel III framework, we compute the ratio liquid assets-to-total assets for each bank and year as a proxy for the LCR. Moreover, we define a proxy for the NSFR as the ratio total equity plus customer deposits over total assets.
Control variables
We include a set of both bank-and country-level control variables to take into consideration cross-bank and crosscountry heterogeneity over time, which might affect our dependent variables. First, we use a wide set of bank-level control variables to rule out the possibility that effects attributed to capital and liquidity are caused by alternative bank characteristics. Following previous studies, we include control variables that have been traditionally considered as factors explaining both lending and stability (Cubillas and Su arez, 2018; Leroy, 2014) . In particular, we consider bank size, proxied by the natural logarithm of bank total assets (SIZE). In order to control for the importance of additional sources of bank income, we include the non-interest income-to-total revenue ratio (NONINT), which can be interpreted as a proxy of the degree of diversification. We also control for bank efficiency by including COST. This variable is defined as non-interest bank expenses expressed as a percentage of total assets. Thus, higher values of this variable would be associated with less efficient banks.
We also introduce a set of country-level controls. We include the Lerner index (LERNER) that proxies for the level of market power in each country and year. It is calculated as the difference between price (interest rate) and marginal cost expressed as a percentage of price. It assumes that the divergence between product price and marginal cost of production is the essence of monopoly power. According to this definition, the Lerner index takes value zero in the case of perfect competition and it takes value one under perfect monopoly.
Finally, we include the growth in GDP per capita as a macroeconomic control variable (ΔGDPpc) and the annual growth rate of the consumer prices index (INFLATION) of each country. Both variables are collected from World Development Indicators dataset (Table 1) .
Results
Capital, liquidity and loans growth
First, we test the impact of both capital and liquidity on the growth of loans. Especially relevant is to consider the effect of the quality of the existent amount of credit previously ΔLOANS is the annual growth rate of bank net loans. ZSCORE is the natural logarithm of the Z-score. IMPAIRED is the ratio impaired and nonperforming loans over gross loans.
TIER1 is the TIER1 capital ratio. LCR is the liquidity coverage ratio measured as the liquid assets-to-total assets ratio. NSFR is the net stable funding ratio computed as total equity plus customers' deposits over total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total bank assets. NONINT is the non-interest income-to-total revenue ratio. COST is personnel expenses and other non-interest expenses over total assets. KKZ is the KKZ index of institutional quality. LERNER is the Lerner index.
ΔGDPpc is the annual growth rate in real GDP per capita. INFLATION is the annual growth rate of consumer prices index.
Global Policy (2020) 11: Suppl.1 granted. This is why in this initial set of results presented in Table 2 we control for the existent amount of impaired and nonperforming loans as a percentage of gross loans of each bank and year (IMPAIRED). In columns (1) and (2), we report our basic findings using the entire sample of banks and including the ratio impaired and nonperforming loans over gross loans lagged by one period as an additional control variable. Second, in columns (3) to (6), apart from controlling for the lagged value of the IMPAIRED variable, we show the results by subsamples of banks according to the level of impaired and nonperforming loans. In particular, we define a dummy variable that takes value one if the bank in a particular year is above the 50th percentile of impaired loans and nonperforming loans-to-gross loans ratio, and zero otherwise. We consider the value of the IMPAIRED variable in 2009 in order to take into account the increased levels of default rates in our sample because of the crisis episode and its potential impact on the capacity of capital and liquidity to affect the supply of new loans. In columns (1), (3), and (5), we use the LCR variable as the one related to liquidity standards. In columns (2), (4), and (6), our proxy for NSFR is used. In all the cases, our proxy for bank capital is the TIER1 ratio.
On average, there is a positive effect of capital on the growth of bank loans. These results, consistently with Ayuso et al. (2004 ), Ko sak et al. (2015 or Jim enez et al., (2012) , suggest that higher levels of capital foster banks' ability to absorb losses from their asset-side operations and improve their capacity to accommodate faster loan growth. Hence, banks with higher TIER1 capital ratios can lend more than banks with small levels of capital.
As for liquidity standards, our results suggest that LCR and NSFR work in different ways. Results presented in panels A, B, and C indicate that, on average, the higher level of LCR promotes loan growth regardless the quality of the existent bank loans. This finding would be consistent with banks with buffer stocks of liquid assets being able to originate more credit (Naceur et al., 2018) . We do not find, however, any significant result for the effect of the NSFR on the growth of loans.
We obtain a negative and statistically significant coefficient for size (SIZE) and for the variable that proxies for the quality of the existent amount of loans (IMPAIRED). Larger banks and banks with higher levels of impaired and nonperforming loans over gross loans are the ones with the relative lowest rates of growth of new loans. NONINT presents a This table shows the results of the effect of capital and liquidity requirements on loan growth. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of bank net loans (ΔLOANS). TIER1 is the TIER1 capital ratio. LCR is the liquidity coverage ratio. NSFR is the net stable funding ratio. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. NONINT is the non-interest income-to-total revenue ratio. COST is the non-interest expenses over total assets ratio. IMPAIRED is the ratio impaired and nonperforming loans over gross loans. LERNER is the Lerner index.
ΔGDPpc is the annual growth rate in real GDP per capita. INFLATION measures the annual growth rate of consumer prices index. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at 1 and 5 per cent, respectively. positive coefficient, although it is statistically significant in four out of the six estimates. This would indicate that the higher the relevance of non-traditional banking activities in the bank balance sheet, the higher the growth rate of net loans. Hence, the higher the ability of the bank to diversify risks across different types of investments, the higher its capability to hedge against potential losses and the higher the provision of new credit. COST shows different signs of its coefficient depending on the subsample of banks examined. In particular, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient in column (3) and a positive one in columns (5) and (6). This indicates that, in the case of banks with lower quality of granted loans, higher levels of operational costs reduces the provision of new loans. The result is completely the opposite in the case of banks with better credit quality.
LERNER presents a negative coefficient. Consistently with the classic argument from the industrial organization literature, in less competitive banking markets there is a lower amount of loans provided by banks. The growth in per capita GDP (ΔGDPpc) has a positive and significant coefficient in all estimates, whereas INFLATION is negatively and significantly associated to the growth of bank loans in three out of six regressions.
We now consider the extent to which the effect of capital and liquidity on loan growth could be shaped by the legal and institutional environment. First, we use the variable CREDITOR to measure a country's overall quality of creditor rights protection. This variable measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders. Second, we consider a variable that approximates whether banks are allowed to take part in activities that generate non-interest income (RESTRICT). In particular, this variable indicates whether bank activities in the securities, insurance, real estate markets, and participation on the ownership and control of non-financial firms are: (1) unrestricted; (2) permitted; (3) restricted; or (4) prohibited. Higher values of this variable indicate more restrictions on bank activities. Third, we consider the extent to which bank participation on the ownership and control of non-financial firms is regulated (OWN). This variable can range from a minimum value of 1 to a maximum value of 4. It is constructed giving value 1, 2, 3, or 4 if the bank participation as an owner of a non-financial firm is (1) unrestricted, (2) permitted, (3) restricted, or (4) prohibited.
In Table 3 , we present our findings. We obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient for TIER1 indicating that, on average, the impact of higher capital on loan growth remains positive after controlling for creditor rights and bank regulation. Our results suggest, however, that this effect is shaped by the quality of protection of creditor rights and by the regulatory restrictions on non-traditional banking activities. Specifically, although higher capital requirements are positively associated to loan growth, in countries with higher protection of creditor rights (CRED-ITOR) and higher levels of restrictions on non-traditional banking activities (RESTRICT and OWN), the effect is the opposite. This suggests the existence of a potential substitute effect between the effectiveness of requirements on bank capital and the features of the legal and institutional framework in terms of creditor rights protection and regulation on bank activities.
We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction between the LCR and CREDITOR, suggesting a complementary effect between LCR and the quality of protection of creditor rights to promote a higher loan growth. The sign of the interaction LCR*OWN is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the effect of the LCR on loan growth is more negative in countries with higher levels of restrictions on bank ownership and control of non-financial firms. Although negative, the coefficient of the interaction term LCR*RESTRICT is not statistically significant at conventional levels. These findings may indicate that the most positive effect of liquidity standards to incentivize banks to lend more takes place in countries with lower restrictions on non-traditional banking activities. In these environments, it is easier for them to hedge against potential losses from the credit activity and are more prone to increase the amount of lending.
Finally, we only obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction between our proxy for NSFR and CREDITOR in model (2). This result suggests that the higher amount of stable funding only promotes lending in the case of countries where the quality of protection of creditor rights is higher.
Capital, liquidity and loans growth: influence on bank stability
Once we have shown how bank capital and liquidity requirements influence loan growth and how bank-level characteristics and the features from the institutional and regulatory environment may shape these relationships, in Table 4 we examine the results for equations explaining bank stability. The individual coefficient of the capital and liquidity variables capture their impact on the level of bank stability due to channels different from changes in loan growth. The coefficient of ΔLOANSp indicates the impact of both capital and liquidity through changes in the growth of bank loans. The Wald test obtained in the first-stage equation confirms the significance and suitability of the instrument used to explain the variation on bank credit supply in the first stage (KKZ).
Results for the first-stage estimates in columns (1) and (2) confirm the positive effect of both TIER1 and LCR on the growth of bank loans. According to our previous results, we do not find any statistically significant effect of the NSFR variable on loans growth. The individual coefficients for TIER1 and LCR are negatively and significantly associated with the ZSCORE variable in column (3). The individual effect of the NSFR variable shown in column (4) indicates that higher amount of stable funding in the bank balance sheet positively affects stability through channels different from lending supply.
In columns (3) and (4), we obtain a positive and significant coefficient for the predicted values of the growth of loans obtained from the first-stage regression. The arguments behind this finding could be related to the fact that the new loans are granted following prudential criteria and at rates that do compensate for the associated default risk of each lending operation. Moreover, under these (safer) circumstances, the growth in loans is coherent with the need for continuing holding sufficient amount of capital. This table shows the results if the impact of capital and liquidity on loan growth is shaped by the characteristics of the legal and institutional environment. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of bank net loans (ΔLOANS). TIER1 is the TIER1 capital ratio. LCR is the liquidity coverage ratio. NSFR is the net stable funding ratio. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. NONINT is the non-interest income-to-total revenue ratio. COST is the non-interest expenses over total assets ratio. IMPAIRED is the ratio impaired and nonperforming loans over gross loans. CREDITOR is the index of protection of creditor rights. RESTRICT is the indicator of the extent to which non-traditional banking activities are permitted in a country. OWN indicates the extent to which banks are allowed to participate the capital of a non-financial firm. LERNER is the Lerner index. ΔGDPpc is the annual growth rate in real GDP per capita. INFLATION measures the annual growth rate of consumer prices index. ***; ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively.
Overall, the higher levels of loans granted by banks that increased their capital and liquidity ratios promote more solvent and stable bank entities. Hence, new loans seem to act as a specific channel through which regulation helps banks to reduce their risk-taking incentives and, thereby, increase bank stability. Regarding the control variables, SIZE is positively associated with the ZSCORE, suggesting that larger banks are safer than smaller ones as they are more able to diversify and manage risks than smaller banks. NONINT coefficient in column (4) suggests that banks with a higher proportion of non-interest income are more stable. We associate this result with the benefits of diversification of activities in risk management. COST, as an inverse proxy of efficiency, is also significant to explain ZSCORE. In particular, the negative sign of its coefficient in columns (3) and (4) indicates that banks that are less efficient keep lower levels of stability. The positive and significant coefficient of LERNER in column (3) suggests that, according to the arguments developed by the competition-fragility view, a higher degree of market power in the banking sector may encourage banks to reduce risktaking and, therefore, increase their stability level. In column (3), we obtain a negative and a positive significant coefficient for ΔGDPpc and INFLATION, respectively.
Capital, liquidity, and loan growth: influence on bank stability in different legal and institutional environments
In this section, we examine the influence of the legal and institutional environment on the role played by loan growth to counteract the impact of capital and liquidity standards on bank stability. Results in Table 5 indicate that the effect of ΔLOANSp on ZSCORE remains positive and statistically significant. This indicates that although, on average, both TIER1 and LCR reduce bank stability, the effect is counteracted by the increase in bank loans. Results in columns (1) and (4) This table presents the results examining the effect of both capital and liquidity on bank stability and its effect through changes in lending. The dependent variable in the second stage is the ZSCORE. TIER1 is the TIER1 capital ratio. LCR is the liquidity coverage ratio. NSFR is the net stable funding ratio. ΔLOANSp are the predicted values of the growth rate of loans obtained from the first-stage estimations. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. NONINT is the non-interest income-to-total revenue ratio. COST is the non-interest expenses over total assets ratio. KKZ is the KKZ index of institutional quality in each country. LERNER is the Lerner index. ΔGDPpc is the annual growth rate in real GDP per capita. INFLATION is the annual growth rate of consumer prices index. ***; ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively.
show that CREDITOR is negatively related to stability, suggesting that higher protection of creditor rights may increase banks incentives to take more risks and, therefore, reduce stability. We must be cautious, however, with this result as it is only statistically significant in column (4). According to the coefficient of the interaction term, our results suggest that the quality of protection of creditor rights acts as a complementary of the predicted values of the growth of bank loans to increase bank stability. Hence, this evidence suggests that the role of Basel III capital and liquidity requirements to reduce bank risk-taking incentives through changes in the growth of loans is more relevant in countries with higher level of creditor rights protection. Consequently, overall, it emerges that capital and liquidity work better in a context where the quality of protection of creditor rights is higher.
In terms of activities regulation, we obtain positive and significant coefficients for both RESTRICT and OWN indicating that higher restrictions on non-traditional banking activities promotes higher stability levels. This result could be consistent with literature that states that allowing banks to expand into non-traditional businesses may increase systematic risk (DeYoung and Roland, 2001) . However, the results for the interaction terms with the predicted value of the growth of loans suggest that the most relevant role of the increased lending to promote stability takes place in the case of countries with lower restrictions on non-traditional banking activities. This result remarks the suitability of allowing banks to enroll activities different from (traditional) credits and deposits to diversify risks and increase their capacity to absorb losses and, therefore, their stability levels. This result is also coherent with the positive sign found for the NONINT variable in Table 4 .
Finally, in a similar vein, our results are consistent with the more positive role of capital and liquidity to promote higher bank stability through the lending channel in countries with lower level of restrictions on banks participation in the ownership structure of non-financial firms. This finding suggests again the positive role of Basel III new regulatory framework to promote safer lending and increase bank ΔLOANSp are the predicted values of the growth rate of loans obtained from the first-stage estimations. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. NONINT is the non-interest income-to-total revenue ratio. COST is personnel expenses and other non-interest expenses over total assets. CREDITOR is the index of protection of creditor rights. RESTRICT is the indicator of the extent to which non-traditional banking activities are permitted in a country. OWN indicates the extent to which banks are allowed to participate the capital of a non-financial firm LERNER is the Lerner index. ΔGDPpc is the annual growth rate in real GDP per capita. INFLATION is the annual growth rate of consumer prices index. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at 1 and 5, respectively. stability especially in countries with less stringent restrictions on banks diversification strategies.
Conclusions
This paper examines two key aspects of the ever-increasing complexity of the Basel III standards: the relationship between capital and liquidity requirements and banks' loan growth, and the effects of loan growth on bank stability. Using data of more than 2,000 commercial banks from 117 countries, we examine the nexus among regulatory requirements, lending, and stability. We find that there are positive effects of capital requirements and short-term liquidity buffers on the growth of lending. Notwithstanding the tightening Basel III regulation, lending has increased in the presence of higher capital requirements and liquidity coverage ratios. Our findings suggest that the intensity of the relationship between bank capital and liquidity and loan growth is affected by creditor rights protection and bank activity regulation. By applying a 2SLS methodology, we provide evidence on a positive relationship between the increased level of loan growth and bank Z-score that is consistent with the higher growth of loans -promoted by higher capital and liquidity standards-increasing bank stability at the same time. Moreover, our analysis provides evidence on the existence of a potential substitute effect between capital requirements and creditor rights protection and regulation on bank activities.
More generally, our study supports the idea that a holistic approach to analyze the interaction among capital and liquidity and bank lending is required. The 2SLS analysis is coherent with the need to adopt an integrated and unitary framework to explain and assess the strategic interaction at bank-level. Thus, our evidence contributes to the debate on whether the more stringent Basel III conditions have a positive impact on loan growth. Particularly important appears the finding that capital and liquidity affect bank stability differently concerning the level of creditor rights protection, bank diversification strategies, and bank participation in the ownership structure of non-financial firms. Our findings have a bearing not only for a better understanding of the effectiveness of the capital and liquidity-based regulatory framework, but offer also potential suggestions to policymakers and researchers in evaluating possible consequences of bank regulation at bank-and industry-level.
Our approach sheds light on the fact that, although it is fundamental to study the direct effect of capital and liquidity requirements on stability, it is equally important to consider the different channels of this transmission mechanism. In our research setting, looking at the sole direct effect of our analysis, it would be straightforward to conclude that capital and liquidity requirements have had a detrimental effect on the banking sector. Unfortunately, this hasty conclusion would be wrong, not only because of the increased level of loans, but also in view of the fact that the loan growth is associated to a higher level of stability. Our paper contributes to the extant literature investigating into the role of the lending channel in the relationship between capital and liquidity on the one hand, and bank stability on the other. In this regard, further research to detect and analyze other transmission mechanisms might be extremely valuable.
The aforementioned positive indirect relationship is even stronger in countries with higher level of protection of creditor rights. This finding is related to the fact that the increased level of lending is safer and does not lead to higher level of instability if creditor rights are properly protected.
As for bank activity regulation, looking at the direct effects of capital and liquidity requirements on stability, it emerges that higher restrictions on non-traditional banking activities lead to lower level of risk. This finding suggests that allowing financial institutions to expand into non-traditional businesses may increase their risk exposure. However, our results also suggest that the most relevant role of the increased lending to promote stability takes place in countries with lower restrictions on non-traditional banking activities. Hence, this finding remarks the importance of allowing banks to engage in activities different from traditional ones, in order to diversify their risk exposure and enhance their stability levels. Once again, the closer inspection on the lending channel provides crucial information to assess the impact of capital and liquidity requirements on bank stability.
In conclusion, it is important to remark that when it comes to the introduction of new regulatory requirements, policymakers should deal not only with the direct effects of their decisions, but also to any indirect transmission mechanism that could completely revert the overall effects of their corrective actions.
